Reasonable Ethics

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The reasonable person standard plays a key role in negligence law, where behavior falling below the standard triggers liability. The reasonable person standard also appears in contract law, criminal law, civil rights law, and elsewhere. CQ Press Your definitive resource for politics, policy and people. Remember me? Back Institutional Login Please choose from an option shown below.

R6 Reasonable Ethics

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Standard V(A) Diligence and Reasonable Basis

Don't have access? View purchasing options. Show Hide Page Numbers. Copy to Clipboard. The reasonable person standard has roots in the development of the concept of Thinking with Kant and Kierkegaard. Gene Fendt - - Peter Lang. Elizabeth C. Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist. Jeanne A. Schuler - - History of European Ideas 21 4 Andrew Chignell - - In Eric Watkins ed. Sidney Axinn - - Rodopi.

Christopher J. Insole - - Studies in Christian Ethics 29 1 What May I Hope? Andrew Chignell - - Routledge.


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Reasonable Hope. Bernard R. Boxill - - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 2 Chiara de Luzenberger - unknown. Hope as a Moral Ideal. Kenneth Seeskin - - Teoria 27 1 But this seems tantamount to saying that because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways. Is this not deriving an "ought" from an "is? How should the proponent of the moral argument define "right" and "wrong?

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Furthermore, you define "objective moral values" as values that are right or wrong irregardless of what anyone else believes. Hence, it seems to me, the truth of the first premise depends on what is meant by "right" and "wrong.

But if the proponent of the moral argument defines "right" and "wrong" in this way, the argument becomes question-begging. At the same time, however, the proponent of the moral argument cannot grant a naturalistic definition of "right" and "wrong," say, for example, "what is conducive to survival.

But such a naturalistic understanding of moral values does not need to appeal to God and thus, if "right" and wrong" were so defined, the first premise of the moral argument would be false.


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So how should the proponent of the moral argument define "right" and "wrong" so as not to render the argument question-begging while at the same time not allowing naturalistic definitions? Is the moral argument a good piece of natural theology? The second premise of the moral argument is, I think, not only true, but obviously true.

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Like you, Dr Craig, I think belief in objective moral values is properly basic: we can simply see that some things are really right and wrong. But if the proponent of the moral argument defines "right" and "wrong" in some nonnaturalistic way, then it seems less clear to me that it is these kinds of moral values that we apprehend. Mackie observed, nonnaturalistic moral values are strange sorts of entities; and while perhaps a trained philosopher may have such moral values in mind when judging something to be right or wrong, the layperson, it seems to me, most plausibly does not.

Hence, it seems that nonnaturalistic moral values are not properly basic. But only if it is these nonnaturalistic moral values which we all recognize in the world is the moral argument a good piece of natural theology. So how do we know that the moral values which we all affirm in the second premise are the same moral values defined in a nonnaturalistic way in the first premise? That is, how do we know we are not really affirming some reductively natural moral values instead? Do objective moral values entail purposeful existence?

In thinking about the first premise of the moral argument, I have come up with what seems to me to be a plausible argument in support of it.

Ethics of virtues and the education of the reasonable judge

This argument runs as follows:. I think most atheists would agree with the first premise; hence, it is the second premise which is crucial to the argument. I must admit, however, that I find this premise plausible solely on intuitive grounds. I just can't see how one can say that the universe is purposeless and then, in the same breath, claim that there are ways we are supposed to be behaving.

For, in a universe with no purpose I am not even supposed to be here; I just am, by accident. But if I am not supposed to be here then how is it that there are objective ways in which I am supposed to be behaving?